Optimality of Excess-Loss Reinsurance under a Mean-Variance Criterion by Li, Danping et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
01
98
4v
2 
 [q
-fi
n.R
M
]  
21
 M
ar 
20
17
Optimality of Excess-Loss Reinsurance
under a Mean-Variance Criterion
REPAIR OF SECTION 3.3
Danping Li∗ Dongchen Li† Virginia R. Young ‡
September 13, 2018
Abstract
In this paper, we study an insurer’s reinsurance-investment problem under a mean-variance
criterion. We show that excess-loss is the unique equilibrium reinsurance strategy under a
spectrally negative Le´vy insurance model when the reinsurance premium is computed according
to the expected value premium principle. Furthermore, we obtain the explicit equilibrium
reinsurance-investment strategy by solving the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
JEL Codes : C730, G220.
Keywords : Mean-variance criterion; Equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy; Excess-
loss reinsurance; Le´vy insurance model.
1 Introduction
An integrated reinsurance and investment strategy is commonly employed by an insurer (cedent) to
increase its underwriting capacity, stabilize underwriting results, protect itself against catastrophic
losses, and achieve financial growth. The study of an insurer’s optimal reinsurance-investment
strategy has received considerable attention in the literature of actuarial science under a variety
of criteria, including minimizing the probability of ruin (see, for example, Promislow and Young
[22], Zhang et al. [31], and Chen et al. [9]), maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth
(see, for example, Liu and Ma [18], Bai and Guo [3], Gu et al. [11], and Liang and Bayraktar [15]),
and maximizing expected terminal wealth subject to a constraint on the variance, the so-called
mean-variance criterion (see, for example, Ba¨uerle [6] and Zeng and Li [27]).
The mean-variance criterion is closely related to maximizing expected utility of terminal wealth.
Indeed, Pratt [21] observes that the certainty equivalence for a “small” random gain Y under
expected utility theory approximately equals
E(Y )−
γ
2
Var(Y ), (1.1)
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in which γ is the absolute risk aversion of the utility maximizer. Note that maximizing (1.1) is
precisely the mean-variance criterion. Also, under fairly general conditions, optimal insurance is
deductible insurance for a risk-averse utility maximizer (see, for example, Arrow [1], van Heervar-
den [25], and Moore and Young [20]). Thus, when maximizing (1.1) (or solving a related game)
with Y equal to terminal wealth of an insurance company, we expect that optimal (or equilibrium)
reinsurance will be deductible, or excess-loss, reinsurance, which we prove below in Theorem 3.2.
Furthermore, because the risk aversion γ is constant, the deductible is independent of the surplus
of the insurer.
Under the mean-variance criterion, the reinsurance-investment problem is time-inconsistent in
the sense that Bellman’s optimality principle fails. To tackle the time inconsistency, we formulate
the problem as a non-cooperative game and solve for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Specif-
ically, at every time point, the player solves for an equilibrium strategy by treating the problem
as a game against all future versions of himself. An equilibrium strategy is, thus, time-consistent.
One can trace this approach to Strotz [24], and it has recently been further developed by Bjo¨rk
and Murgoci [7] for a general class of objective functions in a Markovian framework. Due to
the importance of time consistency for a rational insurer, the approach has already been applied
by many authors to solve for equilibrium strategies in the literature of reinsurance-investment
problems (see, for example, Zeng et al. [28] and Lin and Qian [17]).
Two types of reinsurance policies are most commonly studied in the literature on equilibrium
reinsurance and investment under a mean-variance criterion: (1) proportional (quota-share) rein-
surance (see, for example, Zeng and Li [27], Shen and Zeng [23], and the two references given at
the end of the previous paragraph) and (2) excess-loss reinsurance (see, for example, Li et al. [14]).
Given the rich literature, one question naturally arises which has not received much attention:
Which reinsurance policy yields an equilibrium for an insurer under a mean-variance criterion
among all reasonable reinsurance policies? We show that buying excess-loss reinsurance is the
unique equilibrium strategy under this criterion.
We model the insurer’s basic surplus process, that is, the surplus process without any reinsurance-
investment strategy, by a spectrally negative Le´vy process. The model is widely employed in the
context of risk theory in the actuarial literature (see, for example, Yang and Zhang [26], Chiu and
Yin [10], Avram et al. [2], and Landriault et al. [13]). It is a generalization of many insurance
models studied in the context of reinsurance-investment problems, including the Brownian motion
model (see, for example, Promislow and Young [22]), the classical Crame´r-Lundberg model (see,
for example, Zeng et al. [29]), and the jump-diffusion model (see, for example, Zeng et al. [28]).
We prove that, when the reinsurance premium is computed according to the expected value
premium principle, excess-loss reinsurance is the unique equilibrium strategy for a time-consistent
insurer under a mean-variance criterion. As mentioned above, this result is consistent with several
in the literature; specifically, under the expected value premium principle and various objective
functions, excess-loss (re)insurance is optimal, including when maximizing the expected utility of
terminal wealth (see, for example, Liang and Guo [16], Zeng and Luo [30]) and when minimizing
the probability of ruin (see, for example, Zhang et al. [31], Meng and Zhang [19], Bai et al. [4],
and Zhou and Cai [32]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate our model
and define the equilibrium problem faced by the insurer. In Section 3, we prove that excess-
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loss reinsurance is the unique equilibrium strategy, and we obtain explicit expressions for the
equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy and the corresponding equilibrium value function. We
also discuss two problems closely related to the mean-variance criterion: (1) maximizing expected
exponential utility of terminal wealth, and (2) maximizing the time-0 mean-variance criterion
with commitment. In Section 4, we present some numerical examples to illustrate our findings,
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model formulation
Let
(
Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0 ,P
)
be a filtered, complete probability space satisfying the usual condi-
tions, and let T > 0 be a finite time horizon. Consider an insurer’s basic surplus process modeled
by a spectrally negative Le´vy process defined on this probability space with dynamics
dUt = cdt+ σ1 dB
(1)
t −
∫ ∞
0
z N(dz,dt), U0 > 0,
in which c > 0 is the premium rate, σ1 > 0 is the volatility rate,
{
B
(1)
t
}
t≥0
is an F -adapted
standard Brownian motion, and N(dz,dt) is a Poisson random measure representing the number
of insurance claims of size (z, z+dz) within the time period (t, t+dt). B(1) and N are independent.
For more information about Le´vy processes, please see Kyprianou [12].
Denote the compensated measure of N(dz,dt) by N˜(dz,dt) = N(dz,dt)− ν(dz)dt, in which ν
is a Le´vy measure such that
∫∞
0 z ν(dz) <∞; ν(dz) represents the expected number of insurance
claims of size (z, z+dz) within a unit time interval. The insurer’s premium c is determined under
the expected value principle, that is, c = (1 + θ)
∫∞
0 z ν(dz), in which θ > 0 is the proportional
safety loading of the insurer.
The insurer manages its insurance liabilities by purchasing a reinsurance policy (strategy) with
retained claim {ℓt}t∈[0,T ], with the only restriction 0 ≤ ℓt ≤ Zt when the claim equals Zt at time
t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that the reinsurer covers the excess loss Zt − ℓt. We will look for a reinsurance
strategy given in feedback form by ℓt = ℓ(Zt, t), in which we slightly abuse notation by using ℓ
on both sides of this equation. Technically, we should assume a priori that the retention strategy
depends on surplus, but in Theorem 3.2 below, we will find the equilibrium retention that is
independent of the surplus. Thus, for simplicity, we omit ℓ’s possible dependency on the surplus.
The time-t premium rate of the reinsurance policy is given by
(1 + η)
∫ ∞
0
(z − ℓ(z, t)) ν(dz),
determined again under the expected value principle, in which η is the reinsurer’s proportional
safety loading. It is commonly assumed in the literature that η > θ, indicating that a reinsurance
policy is more expensive than the primary insurance, and by using this assumption, one generally
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avoids trivial results. Under the retention ℓ, the dynamics of the surplus process is governed by
dRt = dUt − (1 + η)
∫ ∞
0
[z − ℓ(z, t)] ν(dz) dt+
∫ ∞
0
[z − ℓ(z, t)]N(dz,dt)
= (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
z ν(dz) dt+ σ1 dB
(1)
t − (1 + η)
∫ ∞
0
[z − ℓ(z, t)] ν(dz) dt
−
∫ ∞
0
z N(dz,dt) +
∫ ∞
0
[z − ℓ(z, t)]N(dz,dt)
=
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + ηℓ(z, t)) ν(dz) dt+ σ1 dB
(1)
t −
∫ ∞
0
ℓ(z, t) N˜ (dz,dt).
Furthermore, suppose the insurer invests in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset
with a constant interest rate r > 0 and a risky asset governed by a geometric Brownian motion
with dynamics
dSt = µSt dt+ σ2 St
(
ρdB
(1)
t +
√
1− ρ2 dB
(2)
t
)
, S0 > 0,
in which µ > r, σ2 > 0, ρ ∈ (−1, 1), and
{
B
(2)
t
}
t≥0
is an F -adapted standard Brownian motion,
independent of both B(1) and N . Let πt denote the dollar amount of surplus invested in the
risky asset at time t, and let {Xut }t∈[0,T ] denote the corresponding insurance surplus process under
a reinsurance-investment strategy u := (ℓ(Zt, t), πt)t∈[0,T ]. The dynamics of the surplus process
{Xut }t∈[0,T ] is, then, given by
dXut = πt
dSt
St
+ (Xut − πt) r dt+ dRt
=
[
rXut + (µ− r)πt +
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + ηℓ(z, t)) ν(dz)
]
dt
+
√
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2πt + σ
2
2π
2
t dBt −
∫ ∞
0
ℓ(z, t) N˜ (dz,dt), (2.1)
in which {Bt}t≥0 is an F -adapted standard Brownian motion, independent of N , defined by
Bt =
σ1 + ρσ2πt√
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2πt + σ
2
2π
2
t
B
(1)
t +
√
1− ρ2 σ2πt√
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2πt + σ
2
2π
2
t
B
(2)
t .
For ease of notation, let Ex,t [·] = E
[
·
∣∣Xut = x] and Varx,t [·] = Var [·∣∣Xut = x].
Definition 2.1 (Admissible strategy). A strategy u = (ℓ(Zt, t), πt)t∈[0,T ] is called admissible if it
satisfies the following conditions:
(1) u is F -progressively measurable;
(2) For all t ∈ [0, T ] and Zt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ℓ(Zt, t) ≤ Zt;
(3) For all (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ], Ex,t
[∫ T
t
(ℓ2(Zs, s) + π
2
s) ds
]
<∞ with probability one;
(4) For all (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ], the stochastic differential equation (2.1) has a unique strong solution.
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The main objective of this paper is to study the reinsurance-investment problem for an
insurer under a mean-variance criterion, that is, one who wishes to maximize Ju(x, t), in which
Ju is given by
Ju(x, t) = Ex,t [X
u
T ]−
γ
2
Varx,t [X
u
T ] , (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ], (2.2)
in which γ > 0 measures the insurer’s degree of (absolute) risk aversion.
Maximizing Ju(x, t) is a time-inconsistent problem in the sense that Bellman’s optimality
principle fails. We tackle the problem from a non-cooperative game point of view by defining an
equilibrium strategy and its corresponding equilibrium value function; see, for example, Basak and
Chabakauri [5], Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [7], and Bjo¨rk et al. [8].
Definition 2.2 For an admissible strategy u∗ = (ℓ∗(Zt, t), π
∗
t )t∈[0,T ], for ε > 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ],
define the strategy uε,t by
uε,ts =
{
(ℓ¯(z, s), π¯), t ≤ s < t+ ε,
u∗s, 0 ≤ s < t or t+ ε ≤ s ≤ T,
(2.3)
in which ℓ¯(z, s) is an admissible retention strategy and π¯ is a real constant. If, for all (x, t) ∈
R× [0, T ],
lim inf
ε↓0
Ju
∗
(x, t)− Ju
ε,t
(x, t)
ε
≥ 0,
then u∗ is an equilibrium strategy and Ju
∗
(x, t) is the corresponding equilibrium value function.
3 Equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy
3.1 Verification theorem
We first provide a verification theorem whose proof we omit because it is similar to the proof of
the verification theorem, Theorem 4.1, in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [7]. Also, see the discussion in Bjo¨rk
et al. [8] about applying the verification theorem under the mean-variance criterion.
For any admissible retention ℓ and for any constant π ∈ R, we define an integro-differential
operator Aℓ,π as follows:
Aℓ,π φ(x, t) := lim
ε↓0
Ex,t
[
φ(Xut+ε, t+ ε)
]
− φ(x, t)
ε
= φt(x, t) +
[
rx+ (µ− r)π +
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + (1 + η)ℓ(z, t)) ν(dz)
]
φx(x, t)
+
1
2
(
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2π + σ
2
2π
2
)
φxx(x, t) +
∫ ∞
0
(φ(x− ℓ(z, t), t) − φ(x, t))ν(dz), (3.1)
in which φ(x, t) ∈ C2,1(R × [0, T ]). In the first line of (3.1), u = (ℓ, π), in which the constant π
represents the strategy in which the insurer invests the constant π in the risky asset.
Theorem 3.1 (Verification theorem). Suppose there exist V (x, t) and g(x, t) ∈ C2,1(R × [0, T ])
satisfying the following conditions:
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(1) For all (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ],
sup
ℓ,π
{
Aℓ,π V (x, t)−
γ
2
Aℓ,π g2(x, t) + γ g(x, t)Aℓ,π g(x, t)
}
= 0. (3.2)
Let (ℓ∗, π∗) denote the pair that attains the supremum in (3.2).
(2) For all (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ],
Aℓ
∗,π∗g(x, t) = 0. (3.3)
(3) For x ∈ R,
V (x, T ) = x and g(x, T ) = x. (3.4)
Then, the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy u∗ is given by
u∗t = (ℓ
∗(Zt, t), π
∗(Xt, t)) . (3.5)
Note that u∗ is given in feedback form. V (x, t) = Ju
∗
(x, t) is the corresponding equilibrium value
function, and g(x, t) = Ex,t
[
Xu
∗
T
]
is the expectation of terminal wealth.
3.2 Equilibrium strategy
One can use Theorem 3.1 directly to obtain an equilibrium strategy. However, we wish to show
that there is only one such equilibrium strategy; to that end, we have the following lemma, which
is similar to Lemma 1 in Basak and Chabakauri [5].
Lemma 3.1 The value function V and expectation of terminal wealth g under the mean-variance
criterion are separable in the surplus x and admit the following representation:{
V (x, t) = er(T−t) x+B(t), B(T ) = 0,
g(x, t) = er(T−t) x+ b(t), b(T ) = 0.
(3.6)
Proof. From (2.1), we have
d
(
er(T−t)Xut
)
=
[
(µ− r)πt +
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + ηℓ(z, t)) ν(dz)
]
er(T−t) dt
+
√
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2πt + σ
2
2π
2
t e
r(T−t) dBt −
∫ ∞
0
ℓ(z, t) er(T−t) N˜(dz,dt)
=: Gu(t). (3.7)
From (3.7) it follows that
Ex,t [X
u
T ] = e
r(T−t) x+ Ex,t
[∫ T
t
(
(µ− r)πs +
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + ηℓ(z, s)) ν(dz)
)
er(T−s) ds
]
, (3.8)
and
Varx,t [X
u
T ] = Varx,t
[∫ T
t
Gu(s) ds
]
. (3.9)
The expressions in (3.8) and (3.9) for the expectation and variance of XuT , respectively, imply that
the objective and the expectation functions for the mean-variance criterion are separable in the
surplus x, as given in (3.6).
In the next theorem, we present the equilibrium strategy and the corresponding equilibrium
value function.
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Theorem 3.2 The unique equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy u∗ = (ℓ∗(z, t), π∗(t)) for
the mean-variance criterion is given by

ℓ∗(z, t) =
η
γ
e−r(T−t) ∧ z,
π∗(t) =
µ− r
γ σ22
e−r(T−t) − ρ
σ1
σ2
,
(3.10)
and the corresponding value function is
V (x, t) = er(T−t) x+B(t), (3.11)
in which
B(t) =
∫ T
t
{
1
2γ
(
µ− r
σ2
)2
+ er(T−s)
[
−(µ− r)ρ
σ1
σ2
+
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + ηℓ∗(z, s)) ν(dz)
]
−
γ
2
e2r(T−s)
[(
1− ρ2
)
σ21 +
∫ ∞
0
(ℓ∗(z, s))2 ν(dz)
]}
ds. (3.12)
Furthermore,
Ex,t
[
Xu
∗
T
]
= g(x, t) = er(T−t) x+ b(t), (3.13)
in which
b(t) =
∫ T
t
{
1
γ
(
µ− r
σ2
)2
+ er(T−s)
[
−(µ− r)ρ
σ1
σ2
+
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + ηℓ∗(z, s)) ν(dz)
]}
ds.
(3.14)
Proof. We verify that u∗, V , and g defined, respectively, in (3.10), (3.11), and (3.13), satisfy
conditions (1)–(3) in Theorem 3.1. To that end, from (3.1), we compute
Aℓ,π
(
er(T−t) x+ β(t)
)
= βt + C
ℓ,π(t) er(T−t), (3.15)
in which C is given by
Cℓ,π(t) = (µ − r)π +
∫ ∞
0
((θ − η)z + η ℓ(z, t)) ν(dz).
Also, from (3.1), we obtain, after simplifying,
(
er(T−t) x+ b(t)
)
Aℓ,π
(
er(T−t) x+ b(t)
)
−
1
2
Aℓ,π
((
er(T−t) x+ b(t)
)2)
= −
1
2
e2r(T−t)
[(
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2π + σ
2
2π
2
)
+
∫ ∞
0
ℓ2(z, t) ν(dz)
]
. (3.16)
By substituting the expressions for V and g from (3.6) into (3.2) and by using the results of
(3.15) and (3.16), we get
sup
ℓ,π
{
Bt + C
ℓ,π(t) er(T−t) −
γ
2
e2r(T−t)
[(
σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2π + σ
2
2π
2
)
+
∫ ∞
0
ℓ2(z, t) ν(dz)
]}
= 0.
(3.17)
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The expression in (3.17) is concave with respect to π; thus, we obtain the optimal value of π from
the first-order condition. Specifically,
π∗(t) =
µ− r
γ σ22
e−r(T−t) − ρ
σ1
σ2
. (3.18)
Next, consider the terms in ℓ in (3.17), that is,∫ ∞
0
(
ηℓ(z, t)−
γ
2
er(T−t) ℓ2(z, t)
)
ν(dz). (3.19)
If we maximize the integrand in the integral in (3.19) z-by-z for a given t ∈ [0, T ], then we will
maximize the integral itself. With respect to ℓ, the graph of f(ℓ) := ηℓ− γ2 e
r(T−t) ℓ2 is a concave
parabola that increases through the origin (0, f(0)) = (0, 0); thus, f ’s maximizer ℓ∗ ∈ [0, z] is given
by
ℓ∗(z, t) =
η
γ
e−r(T−t) ∧ z. (3.20)
If we substitute u∗ = (ℓ∗, π∗) into (3.17) and solve for B(t) (by using the terminal condition
B(T ) = 0), then we obtain the expression in (3.12). Also, if we solve for b(t) (with the same
terminal condition b(T ) = 0) in the equation Aℓ
∗,π∗
(
er(T−t) x+ b(t)
)
= 0, then we obtain the
expression in (3.14).
Thus, u∗, V , and g defined, respectively, in (3.10), (3.11), and (3.13), satisfy conditions (1)–(3)
in Theorem 3.1. To complete this proof, note that u∗ is an admissible strategy, as defined in
Definition 2.2.
Remark 3.1 Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 prove that excess-loss reinsurance is the unique equi-
librium strategy for a time-consistent insurer under the mean-variance criterion; in that sense, we
consider it optimal. Note that the equilibrium strategy is independent of the state variable x. This
independence results from the fact that the risk aversion γ is a constant. See (1.1) in which γ in the
mean-variance approximation of the utility’s certainty equivalence represents the utility’s absolute
risk aversion. Recall that if utility exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, then the form of the
utility function is exponential, and decision making under exponential utility invariably results in
strategies that are independent of the state variable. See Basak and Chabakauri [5] and Bjo¨rk et
al. [8] for further discussion.
Moreover, the equilibrium excess-loss strategy is independent of the parameters of the risky asset
and the safety loading of the insurer, while the equilibrium investment strategy is independent of the
safety loadings of both the insurer and the reinsurer. In other words, the equilibrium reinsurance
strategy is unaffected by the financial market, while the equilibrium investment strategy is unaffected
by the price of reinsurance, and both strategies are unaffected by the price of the primary insurance.
The behavior of the equilibrium strategy is given in the following corollary. The proof is
straightforward and hence omitted. We discuss the intuition behind the behavior of the equilibrium
strategy in the numerical analysis in the next section.
Corollary 3.1 The equilibrium retained claim ℓ∗(z, t) increases in η and t, decreases in r, γ, and
T, and is independent of x, θ, ρ, σ1, and σ2; the equilibrium amounted invested in the risky asset
π∗(t) increases in µ and t, decreases in r, γ, ρ, and T, and is independent of x and z.
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3.3 Related problems
In this section, we compare the equilibrium strategy in Theorem 3.2 with the optimal strategies
for two related problems.
3.3.1 Exponential utility
First, as we observed in the Introduction and in Remark 3.1, the mean-variance criterion is related
to maximizing expected utility of terminal wealth under constant absolute risk aversion γ. For
the latter problem, a standard verification theorem states that if we find a classical solution U to
supℓ,πA
ℓ,πU(x, t) = 0, with terminal condition U(x, T ) = −e−γx, then U equals supℓ,π Ex,t [u (X
u
T )],
in which u(x) = −e−γx. Furthermore, the optimal strategy is given in feedback form by the
maximizer of Aℓ,πU(x, t).
For the model in this paper, it is straightforward to show that the optimal strategy is (ℓu, πu),
in which ℓu and πu are given by

ℓu(z, t) =
ln(1 + η)
γ
e−r(T−t) ∧ z,
πu(t) =
µ− r
γ σ22
e−r(T−t) − ρ
σ1
σ2
.
(3.21)
Note that, for small values of η, ℓu is approximately equal to ℓ∗, but πu is identically equal to π∗.
This result further confirms the close relationship between finding the equilibrium strategy for the
mean-variance criterion with constant risk aversion parameter γ and maximizing expected utility
of terminal wealth with constant absolute risk aversion γ.
3.3.2 Pre-commitment
Second, if the insurer pre-commits to its strategy at time 0 for the entire period [0, T ] to maximize
the time-0 mean-variance objective function in (2.2), then the optimal investment strategy differs
from π∗, as shown in Basak and Chabakauri [5]. Furthermore, the optimal reinsurance strategy
also differs from ℓ∗. We demonstrate the latter statement in this section.
The pre-commitment problem is given by
sup
ℓ,π
Ex,0 [XT ]−
γ
2
Varx,0 [XT ] . (3.22)
By following the work in Zhou and Li [33], we first solve the following auxiliary problem
U(x, t) = sup
ℓ,π
Ex,t
[
αXT −
γ
2
X2T
]
, (3.23)
with the optimal strategy given in feedback form by
(
πˆ(α,Xt, t), ℓˆ(α, z,Xt, t)
)
. Then, by setting
α equal to the solution α∗ of the following equation
α = 1 + γEx0,0
(
X
πˆ(α,Xt,t),ℓˆ(α,z,Xt,t)
T
)
,
(πˆ, ℓˆ) with α = α∗ equals the optimal strategy for the pre-commitment problem in (3.22). We
anticipate the control ℓ will depend on the state variable x and write ℓ = ℓ(z, x, t) in feedback
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form. Furthermore, (πˆ, ℓˆ) clearly depends on x0 through α
∗. Note that U in (3.23) is concave with
respect to x because αx− γ2 x
2 is concave and the surplus is linear with respect to the controls.
If we find a classical solution supℓ,πA
ℓ,πV(x, t) = 0, with terminal condition V(x, T ) = αx −
γ
2 x
2, then V = U , the value function of the auxiliary problem in (3.23). Suppose we have such
a classical solution of this boundary-value problem; without ambiguity, write it as U . Then, the
terms in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation involving ℓ are
max
ℓ
∫ ∞
0
((1 + η)ℓUx(x, t) + U(x− ℓ, t)) ν(dz).
As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we maximize the integral by maximizing the integrand z-by-z for
a fixed value of (x, t) over ℓ such that 0 ≤ ℓ(z, x, t) ≤ z. Because U is concave with respect to x,
it is straightforward to show that the optimal reinsurance is of the form
ℓˆ(z, x, t) = d(x, t) ∧ z, (3.24)
in which d = d(x, t) is given by
d(x, t) =


ℓc, if ∃ℓc ∈ (0, z) s.t. (1 + η)Ux(x, t) = Ux(x− ℓc, t),
∞, if (1 + η)Ux(x, t)− Ux(x− ℓc, t) > 0, ∀ℓ > 0
0, if Ux(x, t) ≤ 0.
(3.25)
At time T , U(x, T ) = α∗x− γ2 x
2, and α∗ depends on x0; thus,
ℓˆ(z, x, T ) = η
(
α∗
γ
− x
)
+
∧ z 6=
η
γ
∧ z = ℓ∗(z, T ).
Thus, the optimal pre-commitment reinsurance strategy differs from the equilibrium reinsurance
strategy for the time-consistent problem.1
4 Numerical examples
Example 4.1 (Equilibrium strategies) In this example, we examine the sensitivity of the equi-
librium reinsurance-investment strategies given in (3.10) to different parameters. Unless otherwise
stated, the parameter values are given by r = 0.05, µ = 0.10, σ1 = 0.20, σ2 = 0.30, η = 0.60,
ρ = 0.50, γ = 1, and T = 9. Denote the corresponding equilibrium strategy by (m∗, π∗), in which
m∗(t) =
η
γ
e−r(T−t) .
1As an aside, note that if we begin the pre-commitment problem at time T − ǫ for ǫ > 0 small, then
limǫ→0 ℓˆ(z, x, T ) =
η
γ
∧ z = ℓ∗(z, T ) because limǫ→0 xT−ǫ = x, in which XT = x. This equality makes sense
because pre-committing over a vanishingly small interval is equivalent to being time-consistent over that interval.
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Figure 1. Impact of r.
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Figure 2. Impact of γ.
In Figure 1, we plot the impact of r on the reinsurance-investment strategy for a variety of
times t. Both m∗ and π∗ decrease as the risk-free rate increases, except for m∗ when t = T , at
which it is constant. When large claims occur, the insurer might borrow from the risk-free asset
to aid in regaining solvency; recall that the amount invested in the risk-free asset equals x− π∗(t),
which is negative when the surplus x is negative. Thus, as borrowing money becomes more costly,
the insurer retains less insurance risk. Furthermore, it is reasonable for the insurer to decrease
the amount invested in the risky asset as the risk-free asset becomes more attractive.
In Figure 2, we plot the impact of γ on the reinsurance-investment strategy. Note that, as the
insurer becomes more risk averse, it assumes less insurance risk and less financial risk.
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Figure 4. Impact of ρ (left) and σ1 (right) on π
∗.
In Figure 3, we plot the impact of η on the retention level m∗. Note that m∗ increases as η
increases. In other words, as the reinsurance policy becomes more expensive, the insurer retains
more insurance risk.
In Figure 4, we plot the impact of ρ, σ1 on the investment strategy. First, we see from the left
panel that as ρ increases, π∗ decreases. Second, we see from the right panel that, as the insurance
market becomes more volatile, the amount invested in the financial market decreases because there
is a positive correlation (ρ = 0.50) between the two markets.
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Example 4.2 (Proportional vs. excess-loss reinsurance) In this example, we assume that
the basic surplus process follows the classical Crame´r-Lundberg model
dUt = cdt− d
Nt∑
i=1
Yi, U0 = u,
in which {Yi}
∞
i=1 is a sequence of independent and identically distributed exponential random vari-
ables with common survival function S(y) := e−κy for y > 0 representing the amount of indi-
vidual claims, and {Nt}t≥0 is a Poisson process with intensity λ > 0 representing the number of
claims, independent of {Yi}. The premium rate c = (1 + θ)
λ
κ
. By applying equation (3.11) with
ν(dz) = λF (dz), σ1 = 0, and σ2 = σ, the corresponding value function under the Crame´r-Lundberg
model is given by
V1(x, t) = e
r(T−t) x+B1(t), (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ],
in which
B1(t) =
∫ T
t
{
1
2γ
(
µ− r
σ
)2
+ er(T−s)
[
(θ − η)λE[Y ] + ηλ
∫ η
γ
e−r(T−s)
0
S(y) dy
]
−γλe2r(T−s)
∫ η
γ
e−r(T−s)
0
yS(y) dy
}
ds.
Moreover, we have
g1(x, t) = E
x,t
1
[
Xu
∗
T
]
= er(T−t) x+ b1(t), (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ],
in which
b1(t) =
∫ T
t
{
1
γ
(
µ− r
σ
)2
+ er(T−s)
[
(θ − η)λE[Y ] + ηλ
∫ η
γ
e−r(T−s)
0
S(y) dy
]}
ds,
and Varx,t1 (X
u∗
T ) =
2
γ
(g1(x, t)− V1(x, t)). The other parameter values equal r = 0.05, µ = 0.10,
σ = 0.30, γ = 0.50, T = 3, θ = 0.50, η = 0.60, λ = 1, and κ = 0.50.
Under this model, we compare the value function V1 with the value function under the equilib-
rium proportional reinsurance V2 determined in Zeng et al. [28], for example. We see from the top
panel in Figure 5 that V1 dominates V2 except at the boundary t = T, where V1(x, T ) = V2(x, T ) =
x. In other words, the equilibrium proportional reinsurance policy is demonstrably not optimal
within a larger class, that is, the broad class of reinsurance policies ℓ for which 0 ≤ ℓ(Zt, t) ≤ Zt.
We also see from the bottom panel in Figure 5 that when mean and variance are viewed sepa-
rately, compared to the equilibrium proportional reinsurance, though the equilibrium excess-loss
policy generates a greater terminal mean, the associated terminal risk is also greater.
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Figure 5. Excess-loss vs. proportional reinsurance.
5 Future research
In future research, we will extend the work in this paper in two directions. First, we will allow
for the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion to depend on the surplus, as in Bjo¨rk et al. [8]. Risk
aversion is generally considered to decrease with wealth, so it would be reasonable to choose γ(x)
to be a decreasing function of x. One natural choice for γ(x) = δ
x
, in which δ is a positive constant,
which one can interpret as the relative risk aversion.
Second, we will consider premium principles other than the expected value premium principle
for the reinsurer. For example, we do not necessarily expect excess-loss reinsurance to be optimal
for the standard deviation, variance, or Wang premium principle.
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